



System Administration & Security

COMP 175 | Fall 2021 | University of the Pacific | Jeff Shafer

Lab 6 Discussion

HTTPS, DNS

Lab 6 – Web Server (Part 3)

Objectives

- Assign DNS name to load balancer
- Obtain HTTPS certificate for encrypted access

Discussion

- HTTPS
 - Certificates
 - Let's Encrypt
 - CertBot
- DNS



HTTPS




HOW HTTPS WORKS



How HTTPS works ...in a comic! 🌈 🎉 🍕

<https://howhttps.works/>

Crab is listening on the communication capturing the message.



Potentially using it for evil.

<https://howhttps.works/>

HTTPS Motivations

- Confidentiality
 - No one can eavesdrop on your communication
- Integrity
 - No one can tamper with your communication (without being detected)
- Identification
 - No one can pretend to be the site you think you are visiting
- All over an untrusted network. *How?*

Encryption!

*Asymmetric
encryption
with public &
private keys*



Certificate Authority

- Third party organization that
 - Issues certificates
 - Confirms identity of certificate owner
 - Provides proof that certificate is valid

- **Let's Encrypt** is a certificate authority run by the Internet Security Research Group
 - Issues certificates for **free** (instead of for \$\$)
 - Goal: **Encrypt entire web** (even your blog!)


*From December 2017, but
excellent motivations for
existence of Let's Encrypt*

Let's Encrypt

AN AUTOMATED CA


Congratulations! Your certificate and chain have been saved as `letsencrypt/live/letsencrypt.org/letsencrypt.pem`. Your cert will expire on 2025-05-07. To obtain a new version of the certificate in the future, simply run Let's Encrypt again.

- Most of the work in issuing a certificate is in verifying domain control
- Let's Encrypt uses a standard protocol to verify domain control automatically prior to certificate generation
- Certificate renewals use this same process



Growth of Let's Encrypt

Let's Encrypt Growth



ACME

- Unlike other certificate authorities (that may or may not validate your *identity*), Let's Encrypt doesn't care about you as a person
 - All it requires is that you have **control over the domain**
- Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol
 - Rather than *humans* renewing certificate manually (every year?), have *machines* renew certificates automatically every 2-3 months
 - <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8555>

CertBot


- Open-source tool created by Electronic Frontier Foundation
 - Requires an HTTP website already online with port 80 open
 - *Other methods, like DNS validation, also exist*
 - Speaks ACME to automate certificate renewal every 60 days
 - Understands Apache and NGINX configuration files
 - Can update config to automatically forward HTTP visitors to HTTPS version of your site



<https://certbot.eff.org/>


Domain Validation

- Agent (CertBot) – *Please create certificate for me!*
 - Here is requested domain (example.com) and my public key
- Challenge from CA – *How can I trust you?*
 - Provision a HTTP resource under a well-known URI on `http://example.com/`
 - Sign a *nonce* (unique number) with your private key



Domain Validation

- Agent (CertBot) – Signs and returns nonce + makes file available on website
- CA – Verifies results, issues certificate, sends authorized key pair to agent





DNS

Domain Name System

DNS



Motivation

- IP addresses are hard to remember
 - 138.9.110.12? Or was it .21?
- Human-friendly names are much better
 - `engineering.pacific.edu`
- How can we translate between the two?

Domain Name System (DNS)

- **Distributed database** implemented in hierarchy of many **name servers**
- **Application-layer protocol**
 - Hosts, routers, and name servers communicate to resolve names (address/name translation)
 - Core Internet function, implemented as application-layer protocol
 - Complexity at network's "edge"

DNS is Decentralized

- No single point of failure
- No distant centralized database
- Easier maintenance
 - Take one or a dozen servers offline without issue
- Support high traffic volume
- *** Scalability ***

What's in a Name?

- `engineering.pacific.edu`
 - `.edu` is top-level domain
 - “`pacific`” belongs to `.edu`
 - “`engineering`” belongs to “`pacific`”
 - Hierarchical! Read from right to left
- Limits?
 - Up to 127 levels of hierarchy
 - Each label can have up to 63 characters
 - Full domain name cannot exceed 253 characters

DNS: Services

- Hostname to IP address translation
 - *“www.pacific.edu” is 138.9.110.12*
- Hostname aliasing
 - Canonical, alias names
- Hostname load distribution
 - Replicated servers – Multiple IP addresses available for one name
 - *“google.com” is 74.125.239.128 or 74.125.239.135 or ... or or ... or*

DNS: Services

- Mail server aliasing
 - What are the **multiple** host names that receive mail for this domain?
 - 1st priority, then 2nd backup, then 3rd backup, etc...
 - Allows you to use 3rd party email services (e.g. Google Apps)
 - *Mail to “pacific.edu” is directed to “pacific-edu.mail.protection.outlook.com” (SPAM filtering)*
- Other / Misc
 - SPF entries for email (Anti-spam)
 - DNSSEC (security/encryption)
 - Many other attributes...

DNS: Record Types (Distributed Database)

Resource Record (RR) format: (**name**, **value**, **type**, **ttl**)

➤ Type=**A**

- *name* is **hostname**
- *value* is **IP address**

➤ Type=**NS**

- *name* is domain (e.g. foo.com)
- *value* is **hostname** of **authoritative name server** for this domain

➤ Type=**CNAME**

- *name* is alias name for some “canonical” (real) name
- *value* is canonical name

➤ Type=**MX**

- *value* is name of **mailserver** associated with name

➤ Type=**TXT**

- *value* is machine readable text (arbitrary)

DNS: Example

```
$ dig pacific.edu any
```

```
; <<>> DiG 9.8.3-P1 <<>> pacific.edu any
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 5270
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 9, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0
```

```
;; QUESTION SECTION:
```

```
;pacific.edu.                IN      ANY
```

Resource Record Type

```
;; ANSWER SECTION:
```

```
pacific.edu. 59 IN A 52.38.242.166
```

```
pacific.edu. 59 IN A 34.210.252.224
```

```
pacific.edu. 899 IN NS ns-110.awsdns-13.com.
```

```
pacific.edu. 899 IN NS ns-1289.awsdns-33.org.
```

```
pacific.edu. 899 IN NS ns-2044.awsdns-63.co.uk.
```

```
pacific.edu. 899 IN NS ns-705.awsdns-24.net.
```

```
pacific.edu. 899 IN SOA ns-110.awsdns-13.com. awsdns-
hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
```

```
pacific.edu. 59 IN MX 0 pacific-edu.mail.protection.outlook.com.
```

```
pacific.edu. 59 IN TXT "status-page-domain-verification=tnw7vhhyh60c"
```

```
pacific.edu. 59 IN TXT "v=spf1 ip4:138.9.110.0/25 ip4:208.117.48.237
```

```
ip4:176.31.145.254 include:spf.protection.outlook.com
```

```
include:spf.qualtrics.com include:spf.mandrillapp.com include:stspg-
```

Resource Record Value

DNS: Example

```
$ dig www.pacific.edu any
```

```
; <<>> DiG 9.8.3-P1 <<>> pacific.edu any
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 5270
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 9, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 0
```

```
;; QUESTION SECTION:
```

```
;pacific.edu.          IN      ANY
```

```
;; ANSWER SECTION:
```

```
www.pacific.edu. 59 IN  A  23.185.0.4
www.pacific.edu. 59 IN  AAAA 2620:12a:8000::4
www.pacific.edu. 59 IN  AAAA 2620:12a:8001::4
www.pacific.edu. 60 IN  TXT  "google-site-
verification=t3PZMb1DhGWjZb0EUyfhnd_zoAMN7yOkDMXyMxSHAh4"
```

Resource Record Type

Resource Record Value

Hosted zones [Info](#)

How hosted zones work



A hosted zone contains records that define how internet traffic is routed for a domain and its subdomains. For example, in the example.com hosted zone, you can create records for example.com and www.example.com that route traffic to a web server running on an EC2 instance or to an S3 bucket.

Hosted zones (1)



[View details](#)

[Edit](#)

[Delete](#)

[Create hosted zone](#)

	Domain name	Type	Created by	Record count	Description	Hosted zone ID
<input type="radio"/>	tigerenterprises.org	Public	Route 53	4	HostedZone created by Route53 Registrar	Z05671742MAUBSH0KZXLY

■ tigerenterprises.org [Info](#)[Delete](#)[Test record](#)[Configure query logging](#)

► Hosted zone details

[Edit](#)[Records \(4\)](#)[Hosted zone tags \(0\)](#)**Records (4)** [Info](#)

The following table lists the existing records in tigerenterprises.org. You can't delete the SOA record or the NS record named tigerenterprises.org.

[Edit](#)[Delete](#)[Import zone file](#)[Create record](#)

< 1 >

<input type="checkbox"/>	Record name ▾	Type ▾	Routing policy ▾	Differentiator ▾	Alias ▾	Value/Route traffic to ▾
<input type="checkbox"/>	tigerenterprises.org	NS	Simple	-	No	ns-27.awsdns-03.com. ns-538.awsdns-03.net. ns-1211.awsdns-23.org. ns-1729.awsdns-24.co.uk.
<input type="checkbox"/>	tigerenterprises.org	SOA	Simple	-	No	ns-27.awsdns-03.com. awsdns-hostmaster.amazon.com. 1 7200 900 1209600 86400
<input type="checkbox"/>	██████.tigerenterprises.org	NS	Simple	-	No	ns-1804.awsdns-33.co.uk. ns-103.awsdns-12.com. ns-666.awsdns-19.net. ns-1080.awsdns-07.org.
<input type="checkbox"/>	██████.tigerenterprises.org	NS	Simple	-	No	ns-651.awsdns-17.net. ns-1534.awsdns-63.org. ns-1718.awsdns-22.co.uk. ns-88.awsdns-11.com.

NS records for STUDENT-1,
STUDENT-2, ...

Nameservers
in student
Route53
zones

DNS: Name Resolution

➤ Two types

➤ **Recursive**


➤ The server you contact provides the final answer

➤ *Behind the scenes, it may make several consecutive requests*


➤ **Iterative**

➤ The server you contact directs you to a different server to get (closer to) the final answer

en.wikipedia.org = 208.80.154.224



I don't know the details for anything under .org, but 5.6.7.8 can help you get closer.



.com	1.2.3.4
.org	5.6.7.8
.net	9.10.11.12
.info	13.14.15.16
.biz	17.18.19.20
...	...


1.2.1.2

index.html	scripts.js
about.html	styles.css
events.html	

208.80.154.224

Can you tell me how to
get to en.wikipedia.org?

Go ask 11.21.31.41.
It knows about
everything under
wikipedia.org.



1.1.1.1



1.3.4.1



3.3.3.1



4.2.4.1

mozilla	5.10.15.20
wikipedia	11.21.31.41
coursera	1.3.5.7
whatwg	10.1.10.1
w3	34.56.12.3
...	...

5.6.7.8



2.2.1.2

en	6.4.12.17
de	9.9.7.5
ru	15.120.1.1
ja	87.6.5.12
fr	9.8.9.200
...	...

11.21.31.41

<https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/05/a-cartoon-intro-to-dns-over-https/>

.com	1.2.3.4
.org	5.6.7.8
.net	9.10.11.12
.info	13.14.15.16
.biz	17.18.19.20
...	...

1.2.1.2

index.html
scripts.js
about.html
styles.css
events.html

208.80.154.224

Can you tell me how to
get to en.wikipedia.org?

1.1.1.1

1.3.4.1

3.3.3.1

4.2.4.1

mozilla	5.10.15.20
wikipedia	11.21.31.41
coursera	1.3.5.7
whatwg	10.1.10.1
w3	34.56.12.3
...	...

5.6.7.8

2.2.1.2

en	6.4.12.17
de	9.9.7.5
ru	15.120.1.1
ja	87.6.5.12
fr	9.8.9.200
...	...

Oh yeah, just go
to 208.80.154.224.

11.21.31.41

<https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/05/a-cartoon-intro-to-dns-over-https/>

DNS: Root Name Servers


- Contacted by local name server that can not resolve top-level domain
- Root name server:
 - Contacts authoritative name server for TLD if name mapping not known
 - Gets mapping
 - Returns mapping to local name server



13 root name “servers” worldwide labeled a - m

- Each “server” is really a cluster
- Some clusters are geographically distributed
- 1094 total in Spring 2020


DNS: Root Name Servers



<http://www.root-servers.org/>

DNS and Security



How much money are
you willing to spend
to see what Jane Doe
has been looking at?



<https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/05/a-cartoon-intro-to-dns-over-https/>

DNS and Security


Send it to 1.6.6.6...
that's totally the right
address and not a fake
one that is under my
control.



<https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/05/a-cartoon-intro-to-dns-over-https/>

DNS and Security

POTENTIAL THREATS



<https://hacks.mozilla.org/2018/05/a-cartoon-intro-to-dns-over-https/>

DNS and Security

➤ Confidentiality

- Traditional DNS request and reply (over UDP) is plaintext
 - ISP spies on your Internet usage for profit?
 - NSA spies on your Internet usage for control?
 - DNS is *not just for names*
- Solutions: **DNS over HTTPS, DNS over TLS**

➤ Integrity

- Traditional DNS request and reply (over UDP) is unsigned
- ISP tampers with reply message? (NXDOMAIN replaced with ad-laden site)
- Governments tamper with reply message? (Domain blocked by court order)
- Hackers tamper with reply message? (Redirect to malware site)
- Solutions: **DNSSEC** (and DNS over HTTP/TLS)

➤ Availability

- *Addressed by DNS distributed database design*

<https://dnsprivacy.org>

Wrap-Up

➤ Questions?

➤ Concerns?

➤ Today

➤ **Lab 5** – Web Server (Part 2)

➤ **Lab 6** – Web Server (Part 3)