

invoice.pdf.exe



6:04 PM · Jan 23, 2022 · Twitter for Android



Software Reverse Engineering

COMP 272 | Spring 2022 | University of the Pacific | Jeff Shafer

KNOW YOUR MALWARE 101



Malware

Software Reverse Engineering

Dexter – December 2012

- Malware that steals credit card transactions from Windows-based POS systems (aka a card skimmer)
 - **↗** POS = Point of Sale...
- First seen: Mid December 2012

Dexter

Key capabilities

- Code injection into iexplore.exe
- Persistence via writing to Windows registry, and ensuring iexplore.exe restarts if stopped
- Scan list of active processes and send to C2 server
 - C2 = Command and Control
- Dump memory of POS programs and send to C2 server for data extraction

Dexter – December 2012

- MD5 hashes of Dexter-related samples (can be used to view analysis on malware websites or download executable)
 - 8b27956f747791ef78faa52d2aca26a1
 - 2d48e927cdf97413523e315ed00c90ab
 - 70feec581cd97454a74a0d7c1d3183d1
 - **7** f84599376e35dbe1b33945b64e1ec6ab
 - ed783ccea631bde958ac64185ca6e6b6

Why don't I have a single MD5 listed here?


Dexter

7

- https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/The-Dexter-Malware--Getting-Your-Hands-Dirty/
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/point-of-salemalware-threats
- https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/12/unpackingdexter-pos-memory-dump.html
 - Suspect this Dexter variant is being described: 70feec581cd97454a74a0d7c1d3183d1



Here's a binary. What does it do?



Automated Malware Analysis

Automated Malware Analysis

Multi-AV scanners

Does an anti-virus product think your sample is malicious? Check a bunch in parallel!

File Reputation

Is this file a legitimate part of Windows, or OS X, or Adobe Acrobat, or Google Chrome, or ... ?

Malware Data Repositories

Run static analysis on malware and view detailed results


Automated Sandbox

What happens if the malware is run ("detonated") in a controlled and monitored environment? What does it do?

MD5 1c7243c8f3586b799a5f9a2e4200aa92 SHA-1 4db5a8e237937b6d7b435a8506b8584121a7e9e3 Authentihash 8cdecbf08525fa3a6854cfc2fcd12281e87ccd760183262b8b430e4f70dbc21e Imphash 475b069fec5e5868caeb7d4d89236c89 File Type Win32 EXE Magic PE32+ executable for MS Windows (GUI) Mono/.Net assembly SSDeep 1536:b6sMD3H8V3jsUnHLIREsTbDV/480O4vh47483gLi9+L5G:b6srVzJiRrTHVORe75g4+LS TRID Win64 Executable (generic) (87.3%) Generic Win/DOS Executable (6.3%) DOS Executable Generic (6.3%) File Size 74 KB File Size 74 KB History © Creation Time 2015-02-25 06:12:18 First Seen In The Wild 2015-02-25 06:12:18		SHA-256 f47060d0f7de5ee651878eb18dd2d24b5003bdb03ef4f49879f448f05034a File name brbbot.exe File size 74 KB	ie
Basic Properties MD5 1c7243c8f3586b799a5f9a2e4200a992 SHA-1 4db5a8e237937b6d7b435a8506b8584121a7e9e3 Authentihash 8cdecbf08525f3a36654cfc2fcd12281e87ccd760183262b8b430e4f70dbc21e Imphash 475b069fec5e5868caeb7d4d89236c89 File Type Win32 EXE Magic PE32+ executable for MS Windows (GUI) Mono/.Net assembly SSDeep 1536b65MD3H8V3jSUHHLIRESTbDV/480O4vh47483gLi9+LSG:b6srVzJiRrTHVORe75g4+LS TRiD Win64 Executable (generic) (87.3%) Generic Win/DOS Executable (6.3%) DOS Executable Generic (6.3%) File Size 74 KB History © Creation Time 2015-02-25 06:12:18 https://www.virustota	58	Last analysis 2017-11-07 09:54:05 UTC	
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Sign in

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
Additional Context

Platform Intelligence
 Associated SHA256s c6745630a65c38aa182de51fccbb7280cb851c210501581cc0e0df3c420034fc

Software Reverse Engineering

Automated Malware Analysis

Strengths and Weaknesses of these tools used in Lab 1?



Automated Malware Analysis

Why might I <u>not</u> want to use these tools?

- File may have sensitive data embedded in it don't want to publicly release
 - Suggest looking up by hash instead of uploading file
- Attacker may be checking the major sites to see if they have been detected yet
 - Highly relevant for a *targeted* attack
 - Irrelevant for mass-market malware
 - Searching by hash may risk tipping off attacker
 - You could run your own, private, automated tool set
- Malware may be too well obfuscated and/or fail to do anything in automated sandbox

Automated tools won't answer *all* of your questions



Do it yourself



Design Question: How do we safely and successfully examine and run malware?

- Should we use a physical machine? Should we use a virtual machine? (Pros/Cons?)
- Physical machine
 - **Pros:** 100% fidelity, harder for malware to escape
 - Cons: Limited by number of physical computers available; Restoring state (either to pristine state or earlier state in middle of infection & analysis process) is inconvenient
 - Must image and restore full disk
 - You may need to do this for certain malware, but not a common case

- Should we use a physical machine? Should we use a virtual machine? (Pros/Cons?)
- Virtual machine
 - Pros: Have as many virtual machines as you want; Snapshots make restoring state easy
 - Cons: Malware can *trivially* detect it is running in a VM. Discuss...
 - Does malware that steals business data or encrypts disks for ransom care in 2020?
 - Does malware that hijacks ATMs or industrial control systems care?

VM Detection

Q: Will the malware behave differently in a VM?


- In 2022, with virtualization and cloud providers being universal, malware doesn't bother with detecting if it is being run in a VM
 - Lots of good data to steal is there!
 - We can come up with specific (uncommon) scenarios where a malware author might care to write the code
 - Older malware (2006-2007) might care, back when VMs were new and infrequently used in business


But, the attackers <u>really care</u> about being <u>analyzed</u> and will look for any signs of analysis tools



Life as a Malware Analyst

Remember, the malware authors are actively trying to subvert you






Don't be shy with taking snapshots in your VM!

- Pristine uninfected state restore to this <u>often</u>!
- Key points in the infection process

 (imagine you're using a debugger, manually stepping through code, and editing variables on the fly to exercise code paths...)
- Wherever you want to restore to without repeating your entire workflow from scratch...

- Should your VM images be Linux or Windows? (assume we have Windows malware to analyze)
- 7 Yes
- Need to run best tools for the job in whatever platform they are available in
- Windows: Dynamic analysis possible you can run the malware
- Linux: Safer no risk of accidentally running Windows malware



Linux / Windows

- How do we ensure the virtual machines remain safely isolated?
- Update the VM software often....
 Update the VM software often....
 Update the VM software often....
 Give VMware all your money... \$\$\$
- There are zero-day vulnerabilities and escalation attacks in hypervisors (VMWare, Virtual Box, Hyper-V)
 - You must be running the latest supported virtualization software at all times

How do we isolate ourselves from the virtual machines?


- Should I enable shared folders between my host and guest VM?
 Ans: NO!
- Should I enable drag and drop between my host and guest VM?
 - Ans: Maybe? How paranoid are you?
- Should I use my guest VM for non-malware-analysis purposes?
 - Ans: NO!
- What is the most likely way of malware escaping?

Ans: HUMAN ERROR

(e.g., having lots of windows simultaneous open and accidentally running malware in your *host*, not *guest VM*. Oops!)

Tip: Use an ugly background in your malware VM and train your mind – "I only run malware on the <u>fuchsia</u> background screen"

- How do I connect my VMs to the network? Do I connect them to the network? (Pros/Cons?)
- Step 1: No network See what the malware does
- Step 2: Configure Windows VM to route through Linux VM, and selectively enable protocols <u>as</u> <u>needed</u> during your investigation (OFF by default)



Should the malware connect to the Internet through my business connection?

What will a malware author think if he checks on IP addresses making C2 requests and sees they are assigned to MalwareExterminators.com or Security-consultants-r-us.com instead of TargetedMegaCorp.biz?

Options

- Tunnel through public VPN service
- Tunnel through private VPN via cloud provider
- **7** Tunnel through TOR
- **7** Get a MiFi hotspot from Verizon 🙂

Suspicious! Commonly blocked. Odds of legitimate target vs researcher or law enforcement not in attacker's favor.

- Related Tip: Don't just use normal wget to fetch a suspicious file from a website
 - Any competent attacker will monitor their logs and pick out the user agent!
 - At a minimum, spoof a real user agent
 - You would never use a real web browser, since you want full control over the downloading process)
- General point: You don't want the attacker to know that you are investigating them for any serious *targeted* attack



Spring 20 2

Analysis Tools

CHERD)

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Software Reverse Engineering

- What tools do we need in the lab?
- Static property analysis (program not running)
 - PEStudio, Strings, BinText, ...
- Interactive behavioral analysis (program is running)
 - Process Hacker, RegShot, Wireshark, API Monitor, ...
- Code analysis/reversing (We WAssembly)
 - ↗ IDA Pro, Ghidra, x64dbg, OllyDbg, ...

Pre-Lab

- Download (see link in Canvas announcement): Windows 10 x64 Reverse Engineering Malware.ova
- Import OVA file into a new VM
 - **Open Virtual Appliance**



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